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Abstract
We report an experimental test of the four touchstones of rationality in choice
under risk – utility maximization, stochastic dominance, expected-utility max-
imization and small-stakes risk neutrality – with students from one of the best
universities in the United States and one of the best universities in Africa, the
University of Dar es Salaam. Although the US and the Tanzanian subjects come
from different backgrounds and face different economic prospects, they are united
by being among the most able in their societies. Importantly, many of whom will
exercise an outsized influence over economic and political affairs. We find very
small or no significant differences between the two samples in the degree of ra-
tionality according to a number of standard economic measures. An alternative
approach is to take cognitive ability (IQ) as a proxy for economic rationality. We
show that a canonical IQ test indicates a much larger development gap in ratio-
nality relative to our economic tests.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we provide new experimental evidence on the question “is there a devel-
opment gap in rationality?” We draw the subjects for the experiment from the student
body at the University of California–Berkeley, ranked as the world’s top public uni-
versity and one of the most prestigious (public or private) ones, and the University
of Dar es Salaam, the oldest and biggest public university in Tanzania, and one of
the best ranked universities in Africa.1 These subject pools carry an intrinsic inter-
est. Although the students at UC Berkeley and the University of Dar es Salaam come
from many backgrounds, they are united by being among the most able in their soci-
eties. We thus procure experimental subjects at the high end of the “ability spectrum”
when assessed for economic rationality. If our subjects do not fit the model of Homo-
economicus, then others in their society are therefore even less likely to be rational
utility maximizers.
These subject pools are also worth studying for extrinsic reasons. Because the stu-
dents of UC Berkeley and the University of Dar es Salaam are among the most able
in their societies, they will presumably assume positions of power in different sectors
of their economy when they graduate into the world and can thus spur growth and de-
velopment. This is especially true for the Tanzania students in our sample, of whom
many will assume positions of substantial power in national economic and political af-
fairs – the current President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, the Prime Minster, Mizengo
Pinda, and his predecessor, Edward Lowassa, all graduated from the University of Dar
es Salaam. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that “Poor countries are poor not
because those who have power make choices that create poverty. They get it wrong
not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose.” The argument stipulates that those who
have power must be rational. This highlights the importance of rigorously testing the
1Webometrics (www.webometrics.info) ranks all universities worldwide based on the impact of
the university on the web. It ranks UC Berkeley as the fourth best university worldwide. The University
of Dar es Salaam is ranked 1,419, but it is ranked first in Tanzania and 11th in Africa.
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rationality of the future leadership in developing countries.2
This is especially true for the Tanzania students in our sample, of whom many
will assume positions of substantial power in national economic and political affairs.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that “Poor countries are poor not because those
who have power make choices that create poverty. They get it wrong not by mistake or
ignorance but on purpose.” This theory stipulates that those who have power must be
rational. This highlights the importance of developing a rigorous test of the rationality
of students in the upper echelons of institutions in their society.3
We focus on choice under risk, because uncertainty is endemic in a wide variety
of economic circumstances and enters every realm of economic decision-making. We
provide a thorough experimental test of the four touchstones of rationality in decision
making under risk: utility maximization, stochastic dominance, expected-utility max-
imization and small-stakes risk neutrality. Inconsistencies with revealed preference
conditions and violations of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) are regarded ir-
rational, regardless of risk attitudes, because they leave “money on the table.” Expected
Utility Theory (EUT) serves as a normative guide for choice under risk (how people
ought to choose), so violations of expected utility and risk aversion over modest stakes
lack normatively appealing properties of rationality. Clearly, choices cannot be con-
sidered rational if there is no utility function that those choices maximize. However,
choices can be rational yet fail to be reconciled with any utility function that is norma-
tively appealing given the decision problem at hand.
The experiment. In the experiment, we present subjects with a standard economic
decision problem that can be interpreted either as a portfolio choice problem (the al-
location of income between two risky assets) or a consumer decision problem (the
selection of a bundle of contingent commodities from a standard budget line). Put pre-
2There is credible evidence that quality education has a strong causal relationship to economic
growth. Education affects economic growth through different mechanisms. The neoclassical argument
is that education increases the human capital of the labor force which in turn increases labor productiv-
ity (cf., Mankiw et al., 1992). Science, technology, engineering and mathematics education promotes
the growth of the innovation economy (cf., Lucas, 1988). For further discussion, see Hanushek and
Woessmann (2007).
3There is credible evidence that quality education has a strong causal relationship to economic
growth. Education affects economic growth through different mechanisms. The neoclassical argument
is that education increases the human capital of the labor force which in turn increases labor productiv-
ity (cf., Mankiw et al., 1992). Science, technology, engineering and mathematics education promotes
the growth of the innovation economy (cf., Lucas, 1988). For further discussion, see Hanushek and
Woessmann (2007).
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cisely, there are two equally probable states of nature, s = 1,2 and an Arrow security
for each state. An Arrow security for state s promises a token (the experimental cur-
rency) in state s and nothing in the other state. Let x = (x1,x2) denote an allocation of
securities, where xs denotes the number of units of security s. Without essential loss of
generality, assume the individual’s payout is normalized to 1. The budget constraint is
then B(p), where p = (p1, p2) is the vector of security prices and ps denotes the price
of security s. The individual can choose any allocation x that satisfies this constraint.
To characterize an individual’s decision-making under uncertainty, it is necessary
to generate many observations per subject over a wide range of budget lines. A graphi-
cal interface was developed for this purpose by Choi et al. (2007b), where subjects see
a geometrical representation of the budget line on a computer screen and choose the
portfolio through a simple ‘point-and-click.’ This intuitive and user-friendly interface
allows for the quick and efficient elicitation of many decisions per subject under a wide
range of budget lines. In particular, the changes in endowments and relative prices are
such that budget lines cross frequently. The broad range of budget lines faced by each
subject allows us to thoroughly test the rationality of decision-making under risk.
Measures of rationality. We study the four rationality postulates underlying the the-
ory of choice under risk:
• Utility maximization. The most basic question to ask about choice data is
whether the data consistent with individual utility maximization, that is, is there
a utility function U (x) such that for any price vector p, the chosen allocation
x∗ maximizes U (x) subject to x ∈ B(p)? Classical revealed preference theory
(Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982, 1983) provides a direct test: choices in a finite col-
lection of budget lines are consistent with maximizing a utility function if and
only if they satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Be-
cause our subjects make choices in a wide range of budget lines, our data provide
a stringent test of GARP.
• First-order stochastic dominance. Violations of monotonicity with respect to
FOSD are regarded as errors – that is, a failure to recognize that some allocations
yield payoff distributions with unambiguously lower returns (Hadar and Russel,
1969). The dominance principle is compelling and generally accepted in deci-
sion theory. Notice that any decision to allocate fewer tokens to the cheaper
security violates FOSD but need not involve a violation of GARP. Choices can
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be consistent with GARP and yet fail to be reconciled with any utility function
that is appropriate to the decision problem at hand.
• Expected-utility maximization. If preferences satisfy the Savage (1954) ax-
ioms, then the preference ordering over allocations x can be represented by a
function of the form U (x) = 12u(x1)+
1
2u(x2) where u(·) is the utility function
over money. Such an individual will choose an allocation x∗ to maximize the
expected value of utility subject to the budget constraint x ∈ B(p). To test EUT,
we estimate at the individual level preferences generated by the disappointment
aversion model of Gul (1991). The model embeds EUT as a parsimonious and
tractable special case.
• Small-stakes risk neutrality. Arrow (1971) showed that expected-utility max-
imizers are arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes are arbitrarily small.
Rabin (2000) presented an empirical claim and a (calibration) theorem which
together show that the risk-neutrality implication of EUT is not restricted to ar-
bitrarily small stakes. In our experiment, the test of risk neutrality is straightfor-
ward, since it requires always allocating all tokens to the cheaper security so that
the preference ordering over allocations x can only be represented by a function
of the form U (x) = 12x1 +
1
2x2.
Summary of results. We assess how the data comply with GARP by calculating
Afriat’s (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI). This measures the amount by
which each budget constraint must be relaxed in order to remove all violations of
GARP. The CCEI is bounded between zero and one. The closer it is to one, the smaller
the perturbation of budget lines required to remove all violations and thus the closer
the data are to satisfying GARP. In our experiment, mean CCEIs across all subjects
are 0.950 in the US and 0.856 and 0.869 with low and high stakes in Tanzania, re-
spectively.4,5 More importantly, we find that the US subjects display greater levels of
consistency than the Tanzanian subjects. The magnitudes imply that the Tanzanian
4Budget lines intersect at least one axis at or above the 50 token level and intersect both axes at or
below the 100 token level. Each experimental token was worth 0.5 USD in the US and 100 TZS (equiv-
alent to 0.06 USD) in the low-stakes treatment in Tanzania. In the high-stakes treatment in Tanzania,
each experimental token was worth 1000 TZS.
5Varian (1990, 1991) suggested a threshold of 0.95 for the CCEI, but this is purely subjective. A
more scientific approach, proposed by Bronars (1987), calibrates the CCEI using a hypothetical subject
whose choices are uniformly distributed on the budget line (more below).
5
subjects on average waste as much as 9.4 (low stakes) and 8.1 (high stakes) percent-
age points more of their earnings by making inconsistent choices relative to the US
subjects. Nonetheless, we argue that most of our subjects are close enough to passing
GARP so that we may not want to reject that their choices are consistent with utility
maximization. This is, to our knowledge, the first quantifiable and economically in-
terpretable measure of the development gap in rationality. Figure 1 below summarizes
the cumulative distributions of CCEI scores.
[Figure 1 here]
The rest of our results are summarized as follows. We use expected payoff calcu-
lations to assess how closely individual choice behaviors comply with FOSD. Over-
all, the choices made by subjects in our experiment show very low rates of FOSD
violations, but the US subjects violate FOSD less. The difference is very small but
statistically significant. As a practical note, the consistency with FOSD also sug-
gests that subjects did not have any difficulties in understanding the procedures or
using the computer program. We next test if individual behaviors comply with EUT.
The parameter estimates vary dramatically across subjects in both samples, implying
that individual behavior is very heterogeneous. Nevertheless, most of our subjects
are well-approximated by preferences consistent with EUT. Using a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) specification, assuming the power form, for 65.1 percent of the
US subjects and 70.1 percent of the Tanzanian subjects, we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis of preferences consistent with EUT using a five percent significance level.
The corresponding numbers according to a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
specification, assuming the exponential utility function, increase to 81.7 and 89.3, re-
spectively. Finally, perhaps as expected, the behavior of only very few subjects in both
samples is consistent with risk neutrality (over small stakes). Overall, the results on
FOSD violations, consistency with EUT and small-stakes risk neutrality indicate no
development gap in economic rationality.
Economic rationality versus cognitive ability. An alternative approach in behavioral
economics is to proxy economic rationality with one of the many tests of cognitive
ability (IQ), which indeed seem to capture aspects of the ability to make rational eco-
nomic decisions (Dohmen et al., 2010). Clearly, consistency with GARP, and the
other rationality postulates above, offers a theoretically disciplined metric for the ra-
tionality of economic decisions, and there is no comparable, theoretically disciplined
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means for using, interpreting, and evaluating an IQ test. Nevertheless, it is useful
to investigate the correlation between IQ and the measures of economic rationality
above. If these measures and IQ are very well correlated, then analysts interested in
measuring economic rationality might replace our tests with one of the many IQ tests
and, in some circumstances, the conceptual distinctions between the measures would
have little practical import. To this end, our subjects also completed a standard (non-
incentivized) Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test (WAIS-IV).
The IQ test generated substantial variation in both samples and the scores are es-
sentially uncorrelated with the CCEI from the experiment (0.063 and 0.110 in the US
and Tanzania, respectively). Figure 2 presents the cumulative distributions of IQ scores
(the fraction of questions answered correctly) in both samples. The difference between
the distributions of IQ scores depicted in Figure 2 is much larger than the difference
between the distributions of CCEI scores depicted in Figure 1 above. In fact, the distri-
butions of IQ scores hardly overlap – the 90th percentile score in Tanzania equals the
10th percentile score in the US. This provides a clear graphical illustration of the ex-
tent to which using IQ as a proxy for economic rationality will inflate the development
gap. In sharp contrast, although individual behaviors are complex and heterogeneous,
we find a high degree of rationality in the sense that most subjects’ choices come close
to satisfying rationality according to a number of standard economic measures.
[Figure 2 here]
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design and procedures. Section 3 summarizes the experimental results on economic
rationality, and Section 4 compares them to results of the cognitive ability test. Section
5 contains some concluding remarks.6
2 The experiment
We conducted laboratory experiments at UC Berkeley and the University of Dar es
Salaam in Tanzania. Full experimental instructions, including screen shots of the com-
puter program dialog windows, are available in Appendix I. The experimental instruc-
tions were in English (the official languages of Tanzania are Swahili and English, and
6The paper also uses several data and technical online appendices for the interested reader
(http://emlab.berkeley.edu/˜kariv/CKST I A#.pdf).
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English is the language of instruction at the University of Dar es Salaam). The ex-
periment began by the subjects completing a non-incentivized WAIS-IV test, which
is the most frequently administered IQ test, and a standard Big Five personality traits
questionnaire.7
Appendix II provides information on the subject populations. It also presents the
results of their IQ test and Big Five personality test. For most attributes, there is no
significant difference in the sample composition between the two subject pools.8 The
two exceptions are that the US pool has a much higher fraction of females (0.706
versus 0.336, p < 0.001) and younger subjects (20.6 versus 23.3, p < 0.001). All our
results are robust to the inclusion of controls for gender and age.
The experimental procedures described below are identical to those used by Choi
et al. (2007a). Each experimental session consisted of 50 independent decision prob-
lems. In each decision problem, a subject was asked to allocate tokens between two
accounts, labeled x and y. The x account corresponds to the x-axis and the y account
corresponds to the y-axis in a two-dimensional graph. Each choice involved choosing a
point on a budget line of possible token allocations. Each decision problem started by
having the computer select a budget line randomly from the set of lines that intersect at
least one axis at or above the 50 token level and intersect both axes at or below the 100
token level. The budget lines selected for each subject in his decision problems were
independent of each other and of the budget lines selected for other subjects in their
decision problems. To choose an allocation, subjects used the mouse or the arrows
on the keyboard to move the pointer on the computer screen to the desired allocation.
7We use the matrix progression part of the WAIS-IV and the Big Five Inventory of John et al. (1991).
The Big Five factors – conscientiousness, openness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism – are
commonly used in psychology to measure human personality. Barrick and Mount (1991) conclude
that conscientiousness is the best predictor of economic outcomes. Subjects were asked to evaluate the
accuracy of statements as descriptions of themselves on a five point scale. The personality scores are
calculated using the procedure of John et al. (2008).
8The Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab) at UC Berkeley draws its subjects from a large
and diverse group of students and administrative staff; but all participants in our experiment were under-
graduate students. Overall, the UC Berkeley students come from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.
Notably, 37 percent of UC Berkeley undergraduates received Pell Grants in 2011-12 (awards of up to
$5,550 per academic year for undergraduate students with family incomes generally less than $45,000
a year).
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Choices were restricted to allocations on the budget constraint.9,10
The payoff at each decision round was determined by the number of tokens in
the x account and the number of tokens in the y account. At the end of the round,
the computer randomly selected one of the accounts, x or y. The two accounts were
equally likely to be chosen. Each subject received the number of tokens allocated
to the account that was chosen. During the course of the experiment, subjects were
not provided with any information about the account that had been selected in each
round. At the end of the experiment, the computer selected one decision round for
each subject, where each round had an equal probability of being chosen, and the
subjects were paid the amount they had earned in that round. Payoffs were calculated
in terms of tokens and then converted into the local currency. Each token was worth
0.5 USD in the US and 100 TZS (equivalent to 0.06 USD) in the low-stakes treatment
in Tanzania, which are roughly comparable in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.
In addition, we also conducted a high-stakes treatment in Tanzania where each token
was worth 1000 TZS, comparable to its worth in the US. Earnings were paid in private
at the end of the experimental session.
An example of a budget line defined in this way is the line AC drawn in Figure
3 below. Let xs denote the demand for the security that pays off in state s and let ps
denote its price. The point B, which lies on the 45 degree line, corresponds to the
safe allocation with a certain payoff x1 = x2. This allocation is consistent with infi-
nite risk aversion. By contrast, point C represents an allocation in which all tokens
are allocated to the cheaper security x1 = 0 and x2 = 1/p2. This allocation is consis-
tent with risk neutrality. Also note that the point that lies in the middle of the budget
line, corresponds to the allocation with equal expenditures p1x1 = p2x2. This alloca-
tion is consistent with maximizing the logarithmic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
9It is of course possible that presenting choice problems graphically biases choice behavior in some
particular way – and that is a useful topic for research – but there is no evidence that this is the case. Ahn
et al. (2013) extended the work in Choi et al. (2007a) on risk to settings with ambiguity. Among others,
Choi et al. (2007b) employ a similar platform to study distributional preferences and produce very
different behaviors. Building on our experimental methods, Choi et al. (2011) investigate the correlation
between consistency with GARP and demographic and economic characteristics in the CentERpanel (a
representative sample of more than 2,000 Dutch households). Since all experimental designs share the
same graphical interface, we are building on the data sets and expertise we have acquired in previous
work.
10Choi et al. (2007a) also restricted choices to allocations on the budget line so that subjects could
not dispose of payoffs. In Fisman et al. (2007) choices were not restricted to allocations on the budget
constraint, but very few subjects violated budget balancedness by choosing strictly interior allocations.
Restricting choices to allocations on the budget constraint makes the computer program easier to use.
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function.
[Figure 3 here]
3 Experimental results
In this section, we first discuss the revealed preference tests used to determine whether
individual choices in our experiment are consistent with utility maximization. Beyond
consistency, it is natural to ask whether choices are also consistent with FOSD. Fi-
nally, we also ask whether choices can be reconciled with a utility function with some
normatively appealing properties, namely EUT and small-stakes risk neutrality.
3.1 Utility maximization
The most basic measure of economic rationality is whether the individual choices are
consistent with individual utility maximization (Samuelson, 1947). If budget sets are
linear (as in our experiment), classical revealed preference theory provides a direct test
of consistency: choices in a finite collection of budget lines are consistent with maxi-
mizing a well-behaved (that is, piecewise linear, continuous, increasing, and concave)
utility function if and only if they satisfy GARP. Conversely, Afriat’s (1967) theorem
tells us that if a finite data set generated by an individual’s choices satisfies GARP,
then the data can be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function.11 Hence, in order
to decide whether the choices are consistent with utility-maximizing behavior we only
need to check whether they satisfy GARP.
Let
{
(pi,xi)
}50
i=1 be the data generated by an individual’s choices in our exper-
iment, where pi denotes the i-th observation of the price vector and xi denotes the
associated allocation. In this context GARP requires that if xi is indirectly revealed
preferred to x j, then x j is not strictly directly revealed preferred to xi. The broad range
of budget lines faced by each participant in the present experiment provides a rigorous
test of GARP, where the relative prices are such that budget lines cross frequently. This
means that our data lead to high power tests of the revealed preference conditions.
11This statement of the theorem follows Varian (1982, 1983), who replaced the condition Afriat
(1967) called cyclical consistency with GARP. The papers by Vermeulen (2012), Afriat (2012), Diewert
(2012) and Varian (2012) published in a special issue of the Economic Journal on the Foundations of
Revealed Preference provide an excellent overview and a discussion of some recent developments in
this literature.
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Although testing conformity with GARP is conceptually straightforward, there is
an obvious difficulty: GARP provides an exact test of utility maximization – either
the data satisfy GARP or they do not – but individual choices frequently involve at
least some errors: subjects may compute incorrectly, or execute intended choices in-
correctly, or err in other less obvious ways. We therefore need to measure how closely
individual choice behavior complies with consistency, where we rely on the Critical
Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) proposed by Afriat (1972). The CCEI measures the
fraction by which each budget constraint must be shifted in order to remove all viola-
tions of GARP.
By definition, the CCEI is bounded between zero and one. The closer it is to one,
the smaller the perturbation of budget lines required to remove all violations and thus
the closer the data are to satisfying GARP. To clarify, Figure 4 below illustrates one
such adjustment involving two portfolios, x1 and x2. It is clear that x1 is revealed pre-
ferred to x2 because p1 · x1 > p1 · x2, yet x1 is cheaper than x2 at the prices at which x2
is purchased, p2 · x1 < p2 · x2. The “least costly” shift of the budget constraint that re-
moves the violation is through x2, since A/B>C/D. The CCEI can thus be interpreted
as saying that the individual is ‘wasting’ as much as 1−A/B of the income by making
an inconsistent choice. The CCEI score thus overstate the extent of inefficiency.
[Figure 4 here]
Although the CCEI provides a summary statistic of the overall consistency of the
data with GARP, it does not give any information about which of the observations
are causing the most severe violations. A single large violation may lead to a small
value of the index while a large number of small violations may result in a much larger
efficiency index. Alternative measures have been suggested by Houtman and Maks
(1985) and Varian (1990). In practice, all these measures yield similar conclusions.
The various indices are all computationally intensive for even moderately large data
sets.12
To calibrate the CCEI, we follow Bronars (1987), which builds on Becker (1962),
and compare the behavior of our actual subjects to the behavior of simulated subjects
who randomize uniformly on each budget line. Mean CCEI score for a random sample
of 25,000 simulated subjects is only 0.600. Furthermore, a large majority of actual
12We refer the interested reader to Choi et al. (2007b,a) for further details on the testing for consis-
tency with GARP. The computer program and details of the algorithm are available from the authors
upon request.
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subjects have CCEIs above 0.90, while less than 0.5 percent of simulated subjects
have CCEIs that high. Our experiment is thus sufficiently powerful to exclude the
possibility that consistency is the accidental result of random behavior. Therefore, the
consistency of our subjects’ behavior under these conditions is not accidental.13
Complementing the graphical presentation in Figure 1, Table 1A below reports
summary statistics and percentile values for the CCEI.14 Of the 126 US subjects, 108
(85.7 percent) have CCEI scores above 0.9, and of those, 83 subjects (65.9 percent)
had values above 0.95. The corresponding numbers for the 216 Tanzanian subjects,
are 113 (52.3 percent) and 88 (40.7 percent), respectively. We interpret these numbers
as confirmation that many subjects exhibit behavior that appears to be almost opti-
mizing in the sense that their choices nearly satisfy GARP, so that the violations are
minor enough to be ignored for the purposes of recovering preferences or constructing
appropriate utility functions.
However, the percentile distributions reported in Table 1 also show that the distribu-
tion of CCEI scores is skewed to the left for the US subjects, indicating greater overall
consistency with utility maximization. Mean CCEI scores across all subjects are 0.950
in the US and 0.856 and 0.869 with low and high stakes in Tanzania, respectively. The
mean CCEI scores imply that by making inconsistent choices the Tanzanian subjects
’waste’ as much as 9.4 (low stakes) or 8.1 (high stakes) percentage points more of their
earnings relative to the US subjects. For comparison, the CCEI scores in similar (un-
published) experiments at Yale Law School, the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA), and the University of Bergen, Norway averaged 0.982, 0.932 and 0.936, re-
spectively. Table 1B reports summary statistics and percentile values for the CCEI for
these subject pools.15
13The power of the experiment depends on two factors. The first is that the range of choice sets is
generated so that budget lines cross frequently. The second is that the number of decisions made by
each subject is large. Choi et al. (2007b) generate a random sample of simulated subjects who imple-
ment the power utility function u(x) = x1−ρ/(1−ρ), commonly employed in the empirical analysis of
choice under uncertainty, with error. The likelihood of error is assumed to be a decreasing function of
the utility cost of an error. More precisely, they assume an idiosyncratic preference shock that has a lo-
gistic distribution where the logistic precision parameter reflects sensitivity to differences in utility. The
analysis demonstrates that if utility maximization is not in fact the correct model, then our experiment
is sufficiently powerful to detect it.
14We need to allow for small mistakes resulting from the slight imprecision of subjects’ handling of
the mouse. All the GARP results presented below allow for a narrow confidence interval of one token
(for any i and j 6= i, if d(xi,x j)≤ 1 then xi and x j are treated as the same allocation).
15The experiment of Choi et al. (2011) consisted of 25, rather than 50, decision problems so the CCEI
scores are not directly comparable. Choi et al. (2011) combine the actual data from the experiment
and the mirror-image of these data obtained by reversing the prices and the associated allocation for
12
[Table 1 here]
We next turn to individual-level regression analyses that examine the consistency
scores more systematically. We define indicators for both the Tanzania sample and
the high-stakes experimental treatment. We also include age, gender and the Big Five
personality traits as controls. The dependent variable is the subject’s CCEI score. Ta-
ble 2 below reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. The results
show that the differences in consistency with utility maximization between the US and
Tanzania subjects are not driven by demographic profiles or by dimensions that are
used to describe human personality in Psychology. There are also no significant dif-
ferences in the CCEI scores between the low- and high-stakes treatments in Tanzania.
We generate virtually identical parameter values using a Tobit specification, which al-
lows for censoring of the dependent variable at zero and one. We also employ quantile
regressions that are less sensitive to extreme values. The quantile regressions for the
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles similarly detect significant differences between the two
subject pools. These results are omitted to economize on space.
[Table 2 here]
3.2 First-order stochastic dominance
Next we ask whether choices are consistent with the dominance principle – that is,
the requirement that, regardless of risk attitudes, an allocation should be preferred to
another if it yields unambiguously higher monetary payoff. The dominance principle
is compelling and generally accepted in decision theory. All typical preference rela-
tions usually considered satisfy FOSD. In fact, as noted by Quiggin (1990) and Wakker
(1993), theories of choice under uncertainty were amended to avoid violations of dom-
inance. A simple violation of FOSD is illustrated in Figure 5 below. The budget line is
defined by the straight line AE and the axes measure the value of a possible allocation
in each of the two states. The point B, which lies on the 45 degree line, corresponds
each observation. Choi et al. (2011) report that, in the CentERpanel sample (representative of the
Dutch-speaking population in the Netherlands), the CCEI scores for the combined dataset involving 50
decisions, like in our experiment, averaged only 0.733. They also find that, in the combined dataset,
subjects with primary or pre-vocational secondary education on average waste as much as 6.8 percentage
points more of their earnings by making inconsistent choices relative to subjects with vocational college
or university education.
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to an allocation with a certain outcome. The individual chooses allocation x (posi-
tion along AB), but could have chosen any allocation x′ (position along CD) such that
Fx′ ≤ Fx, where Fx′ and Fx are the resulting payoff distributions. If this individual only
cares about the distribution of monetary payoffs, then he will be willing to pay a posi-
tive price for a lottery yielding Fx′−Fx, which has only nonpositive payoffs (that is, for
a lottery in which each account had an equal probability of being chosen). Notice that
any decision to allocate fewer tokens to the cheaper security (that is, corresponding to
a position along AB) violates FOSD but need not involve a violation of GARP, whereas
any decision to allocate more tokens to the cheaper security (that is, corresponding to
a position along BE) never violates FOSD.
[Figure 5 here]
We use expected payoff calculations to assess how closely individual choice behav-
ior complies with FOSD. Suppose that we observe an individual choosing allocation
x at prices p where Fx′ ≤ Fx for some x′ such that p · x′ = 1. The extent to which
allocation x violates FOSD can be measured by its expected return as a fraction of
the maximal expected return that could be achieved by choosing an allocation x′. The
construction of this violation index is also illustrated in Figure 5 above. The point D
corresponds to the allocation x′ with the highest expected return, yielding the largest
upward probabilistic shift (referring to Figure 5, the outcome “α points” is shifted up
to “γ points” and the outcome “β points” in unchanged). This suggests the following
approach. For each observation (pi,xi), if no feasible allocation dominates the chosen
allocation, then it has the highest possible value of one. Otherwise, it has a value of
less than one; specifically (α +β )/(γ +β ) (the two states are equally likely). Since
a single number is desired for each subject, we average this violation index across all
decision problems. Table 1C above reports summary statistics and percentile values.16
Over all subjects, the FOSD scores averaged 0.992 in the US and 0.975 and 0.978
with low- and high-stakes treatments in Tanzania, respectively. Out of the 126 US
16Choi et al. (2011) provide a unified measure of the extent of GARP violations and violations of
FOSD by combining the actual data from the experiment and the mirror-image of these data obtained by
reversing the prices and the associated allocation for each observation (that is, assuming that if (x1,x2)
is chosen subject to the budget constraint p1x1 + p2x2 = 1, then (x2,x1) would have been chosen subject
to the mirror-image budget constraint p2x1 + p1x2 = 1). Choi et al. (2011) compute the CCEI for this
combined data set, and compare that number to the CCEI for the actual data. This measures the extent
of GARP violations and violations of stochastic dominance (for a given subject). We favor a “low-tech”
approach, which provides an independent measure of FOSD and is conceptually straightforward.
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subjects, 123 subjects (97.6 percent) have FOSD scores above 0.95, and of the 216
Tanzanian subjects, 185 subjects (85.8 percent) have scores that high. Overall, the
choices made by subjects in our experiment thus show very low rates of FOSD viola-
tions. Nevertheless, there is also some heterogeneity in the FOSD scores within and
across subject pools. Table 3 reports the results of OLS specifications. The dependent
variable is the subject’s FOSD score. We again include age, gender and the Big Five
personality traits as controls. The results show that the small difference in our FOSD
violations scores between the US and Tanzania subjects is statistically significant. We
generate virtually identical parameter values using Tobit specifications. We also note
that there is considerable heterogeneity in the CCEI and FOSD, and that their values
are positively correlated (ρ = 0.485 and ρ = 0.793 in the US and Tanzania, respec-
tively). Finally, there are no significant differences in FOSD violations between the
low- and high-stakes treatments in Tanzania.
[Table 3 here]
3.3 Expected-utility maximization
The empirical validity of the Savage axioms, on which EUT is based, has been tested
extensively by experimentalists. We now turn to the next level of analysis involving
estimation of individual-level, parametric utility functions. Choi et al. (2007a) find
that, for some subjects, the choice data are well explained by a preference ordering in
which the indifference curves have a kink at the 45 degree line, which corresponds to
an allocation with a certain payoff. For EUT, in contrast, the indifference curves are
smooth everywhere. Figure 6 below illustrates a “kinked” indifference curve. One in-
terpretation of this preference ordering is given by the disappointment aversion model
proposed by Gul (1991),
U(x1,x2) = min{αu(x1)+u(x2) ,u(x1)+αu(x2)} ,
where α ≥ 1 is a parameter measuring disappointment aversion and u(·) is the utility
of consumption in each state (the two states are equally likely). In this interpretation,
the safe allocation x1 = x2 is taken to be the reference point. If α > 1 the indiffer-
ence curves of U(x1,x2) have a kink at the 45 degree line where x1 = x2, and if α = 1
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we have the standard EUT representation.17 This formulation thus embeds EUT as
a parsimonious and tractable special case. Maximizing U(x1,x2) subject to a budget
constraint yields a non-linear demand curve. If the security prices are very different,
then the optimum is the boundary portfolio, (x1,0) or (0,x2), with the larger expected
payoff. If the security prices are very similar, then the optimum is the safe portfolio
x1 = x2. In these cases, the optimal choice is insensitive to small price changes. For
log-price ratios that are neither extreme nor close to zero, the optimum is an interme-
diate portfolio and the choice is sensitive to small changes in the risk-return tradeoff.18
[Figure 6 here]
We estimate individual-level utility functions directly from the data using CARA
u(x) = −e−γx and CRRA u(x) = x1−ρ/(1− ρ) specifications.19 The estimation is
carried out using both non-linear least squares (NLLS) and maximum likelihood (ML)
methods. To economize on space, we only report the NLLS estimation results. See
Choi et al. (2007a) for precise details on the estimation technique. Choi et al. (2007a)
also show that the estimation does a good job of fitting the data and allowing us to
classify different types of behavior.
In estimating the parameters, we impose a number of restrictions.
• First, Afriat’s (1967) theorem tells us that when a rationalizing utility function
exists, it may be chosen to be well behaved (piecewise linear, continuous, in-
17These preferences can also be generated by a rank-dependent utility function (Quiggin, 1993). As
proposed by Quiggin (1982), the tendency to equate the demand for the pair of securities can also
be explained by pessimism (overweighting the probabilities of low payoffs and underweighting the
probabilities of high payoffs). The disappointment aversion model of Gul (1991) is identical to rank-
dependent utility in the present design involving two states of nature s = 1,2. With more than two states,
in Gul’s (1991) model the indifference curves have a kink only at the safe allocation xs = xs′ for all s
and s′, whereas in the rank-dependent utility model the indifference curves have a kink at all allocations
where xs = xs′ for some s and s′.
18We note that GARP implies rationality in the sense of a complete, transitive preference ordering,
but it does not imply the Savage axioms. Using revealed preference methods to test whether the data are
consistent with a utility function with some special structure, particularly EUT, is beyond the scope of
this paper. Diewert (2012) provides a combinatorial condition that is necessary and sufficient for extend-
ing Afriat’s (1967) Theorem to choice under uncertainty. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge,
Diewert’s (2012) condition is not a simple adjustment to the usual tests, which are all computationally
intensive for large datasets like our own.
19The power function is not well defined for the boundary allocations. We incorporate the boundary
observations (1/p1,0) or (0,1/p2) into our estimation by replacing the zero component by a small
consumption level such that the relative demand x1/x2 is either 1/ω or ω , respectively. The minimum
ratio is ω = 0.001. The selected level did not substantially affect the estimated coefficients for any
subject. The exponential function accommodates boundary allocations even when initial income is
zero.
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creasing, and concave). We therefore restrict the parameters so that preferences
are always risk γ,ρ ≥ 0 and disappointment averse α ≥ 1.
• Second, because of computational difficulties when the parameters are large, we
also impose the restriction α ≤ 10 in both specifications and γ ≤ 1 and ρ ≤ 5.
This involves minimal loss in fit, since the predicted choices with such a high
level of risk aversion and/or disappointment aversion are virtually identical.
• Finally, subjects with low CCEI scores are not sufficiently consistent to be con-
sidered utility-generated. We therefore present results for all subjects and for
those with CCEI scores above 0.8 in parallel throughout the remainder of the
paper.
To economize on space, the individual-level estimates are relegated to Appendix
III. Appendix III also lists, by subject, the number of violations of GARP, and also
reports the values of the CCEI and FOSD scores. Subjects are ranked according
to (descending) CCEI scores. Table 4 provides a population-level summary of the
individual-level estimation results by reporting summary statistics and percentile val-
ues for the full sample. The distributions are similar for the subsample of subjects
with CCEI scores above 0.80, as reported in Table 5. Although in both the CARA
and CRRA specifications there is considerable heterogeneity in both parameters, the
majority of the subjects in both samples are well approximated by preferences con-
sistent with EUT, a much higher proportion than found in other experimental stud-
ies.20,21 There is also considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ risk preferences in both
the disappointment-averse and disappointment-neutral subsamples but they are within
the range of recent estimates of risk aversion (more below).
[Table 4 here]
[Table 5 here]
20For the most part, these experimental investigations use several pair-wise choices, to test EUT and
its various generalizations. Generally speaking, previous experimental work especially in development
countries has, on the one hand, collected only a few decisions from each subject and, on the other,
presented subjects with an extreme binary choice, designed to discover violations of specific theories.
21Ahn et al. (2013) report an experiment where subjects make choices over three-dimensional budget
sets corresponding to three states of nature, where one state is risky with known probability and two
states are ambiguous with unknown probabilities. Ahn et al. (2013) did not reject the null hypothesis of
preferences consistent with Subjective Expected Utility (Savage, 1954) for 64.3 percent of their subjects.
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Since some subjects are better described by one or other of the models we esti-
mate, the two classes of parametric utility functions do not yield exactly the same
results. Using the CARA specification (top panels), we cannot reject the hypothesis
that αˆ = 1 for a total of 103 subjects (81.7 percent) at the 95 percent significance level.
The remainder appear to have significant degrees of disappointment aversion αˆ > 1.
The corresponding numbers for the Tanzanian subjects with low and high stakes are
95 (89.6 percent) and 98 (89.1 percent), respectively. Using the CRRA specification
(bottom panels), we cannot reject the hypothesis that αˆ = 0 for a total of 82 US sub-
jects (65.1 percent) at the 95 percent significance level. The corresponding numbers
for the Tanzanian subjects with low and high stakes are 80 (75.5 percent) and 73 (66.4
percent), respectively. The behavior of these subjects is consistent with EUT. The re-
sults are similar for the subsample of subjects with CCEI scores above 0.80. Overall,
our individual-level analysis shows that preferences vary widely across subjects and
there is considerable heterogeneity in both parameters in both the CARA and CRRA
specifications. Nevertheless, there are no significant differences in the fraction of sub-
jects consistent with EUT between the two samples. We omit the regression analysis
for the sake of brevity.
3.4 Small-stakes risk neutrality
Except for the high-stakes treatment in Tanzania, not allocating all tokens to the cheaper
security is hard to reconcile with a standard (Savage-based) theory of choice under risk
regarding wealth. Any such small-stakes risk aversion is often called loss aversion. Ar-
row (1971) showed that expected-utility maximizers are arbitrarily close to risk neutral
when stakes are arbitrarily small, and Rabin (2000) showed that the risk-neutrality im-
plication of EUT is not restricted to arbitrarily small stakes. Because the experimental
decision problem is symmetric (the two states are equally likely) and budget lines
are drawn from a symmetric distribution, we can summarize the risk attitudes of our
subjects by reporting the average fraction of tokens allocated to the cheaper security.
Always allocating all tokens to the cheaper security corresponds to risk neutrality (and
equally dividing all tokens corresponds to infinite risk aversion).
Like the revealed preference tests, the advantage of this measure is that it is non-
parametric. It summarizes attitudes toward risk in a single number, making no assump-
tions about the parametric form of the underlying utility function. Further, because
we observe many choices over a wide range of budget lines, it describes preferences
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with considerable precision. Because the purpose of the risk elicitation is to test for
consistency with small-stakes risk neutrality, we favor this “low-tech” nonparamet-
ric approach, which provides a good fit and is conceptually straightforward, over the
structural estimation above. Table 1D above reports summary statistics and percentile
values for the full sample. The distributions are similar for the subsample of subjects
with CCEI scores above 0.80. Of all our subjects, only one US subject and one Tan-
zanian subject (in the low-stakes treatment) allocated all their tokens to x1 if p1 < p2
and to x2 if p1 > p2 implying risk-neutral preferences. In addition, the hypothesis that
preferences are consistent with risk neutrality is rejected for all other subjects with the
CRRA (αˆ = 1 and ρˆ = 0) and CARA (αˆ = 1 and γˆ = 0) specifications.
4 Economic rationality versus cognitive ability
Our experimental results stand in sharp contrast to a very large development gap in
rationality if measured by a test of cognitive ability (IQ) which is often used as a
proxy for how rational individuals are in making economic decisions (see, for example,
Dohmen et al. (2010)).22 Figure 1 above summarizes the cumulative distributions of
CCEI scores and Figure 2 summarizes the cumulative distributions of IQ scores in
both samples. Table 6 summarizes the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile values of the
CCEI, FOSD and IQ scores for the full sample and reports the fractions of Tanzanian
and US subjects whose scores are below these values. Most notably, 82.7 percent of
the Tanzanian subjects have IQ scores below the joint median, compare to only 7.9
percent of the US subjects. The corresponding numbers for the CCEI scores are 59.3
and 34.1 percent and for the FOSD scores are 63.0 and 27.8 percent, respectively.
Finally, in Table 7 we repeat the OLS estimation reported in Tables 2 and 3 using the
subjects’ IQ scores instead of the CCEI or FOSD scores as the dependent variable.
[Table 6 here]
[Table 7 here]
We note that the four measures of economic rationality tested in this paper – utility
maximization, stochastic dominance, expected-utility maximization and small-stakes
22Burks et al. (2009) report a correlation of approximately 0.22 between IQ and switching more than
once in Holt and Laury’s (2002) multiple price list experiments.
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risk neutrality – offer a theoretically disciplined metric for quality of economic deci-
sions. These measures have well-established economic interpretations and classical
theory tells us whether we have enough data to make them statistically useful. There
is no comparable, theoretically disciplined means for using, interpreting, and evalu-
ating an IQ test. Another advantage of the economic measures of rationality over IQ
tests is that the former are easily portable to a variety of choice problems. We can thus
make domain-specific predictions and study a comparable measure of decision-making
quality across domains. For example, the same experimental platform and analysis of
individual choice problems can be used to study consumption over time.
In addition, our experimental task does not involve right and wrong answers, and
does not demand any outside particular knowledge or expertise. Virtually all IQ tests
have right and wrong answers, and thus draw on outside knowledge and depend on
preferences for obtaining certain skills. For example, Raven’s matrix tests, spatial re-
lations tests, and number series tests, all have right and wrong answers and all involve
skills developed by learning Mathematics. Stanovich (2009) provides a critique of IQ
tests as measures of decision-making ability. Overall, we view our methods as com-
plementing those based on standard experimental methods, psychological factors, and
cognitive tasks, and future work will investigate the relationship between our economic
approach, performance on these other tasks, and important behaviors in the real world.
5 Conclusion
We tested the four touchstones of rationality in a choice under risk experiment. Our
subjects are students from UC Berkeley, one of the best universities in the United
States, and the University of Dar es Salaam, one of the best universities in Africa. The
Tanzanian and the US subjects differ substantially in sociodemographic and economic
backgrounds and face very different economic prospects. Nevertheless, they represent
the same ‘slice’ of the most able in their societies. Since innovation and the resulting
economic growth require a skilled workforce, the students of UC Berkeley and the
University of Dar es Salaam are among the ones who will drive economic growth once
they graduate into the world.
Our results are summarized as follows. We find that the US subjects tend more
toward utility maximization than the Tanzanian subjects. We use the CCEI (and other
goodness-of-fit indices) to measure the extent of GARP violation. The magnitudes
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imply that the Tanzanian subjects on average waste as much as 8.7 percentage points
more of their earnings by making inconsistent choices than the US subjects. This pro-
vides a quantifiable and economically interpretable measure of the development gap
in rationality. Tests of monotonicity with respect to FOSD, expected-utility maximiza-
tion, and small-stakes risk neutrality indicate a very small or no development gap in
rationality.
Our study has important practical implications in political economy. This is espe-
cially true for the Tanzanian students in our sample who will likely exercise an outsized
influence and assume positions of substantial power in national and indeed global eco-
nomic and political affairs. Their high level of economic rationality supports the theory
of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that policymakers in poor nations “get it wrong not
by mistake or ignorance but on purpose.” Finally, our results also suggest a number of
potential directions for future work. Policymakers make choice (over lotteries) with
outcomes that have both personal and social consequences. Students of elite universi-
ties thus graduate into a world that allows them opportunities to implement their social
preferences. Our experimental technique allows for the collection of richer data about
preferences than has heretofore been possible, and can provide a positive account of
preferences for both personal and social consumption in rich choice environments (cf.
Fisman et al. (2007)).
References
Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, Crown Business.
Afriat, S. N. (1967). “The construction of a utility function from expenditure data,”
International Economic Review, 8(1): 67–77.
Afriat, S. N. (1972). “Efficiency estimation of production functions,” International
Economic Review, 13(3): 568–598.
Afriat, S. N. (2012). “Afriat’s theorem and the index number problem,” Economic
Journal, 122(560): 295–304.
Ahn, David, Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, and Shachar Kariv (2013). Forthcoming,
Quantitative Economics.
21
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1971). Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, Chicago: Markham
Publishing.
Barrick, Murray R. and Michael K. Mount (1991). “The Big Five personality dimen-
sions and job performance: A meta-analysis,” Personnel Psychology, 44(1): 1–26.
Becker, Gary S. (1962). “Irrational behavior and economic theory,” Journal of Political
Economy, 70(1): 1–13.
Bronars, Stephen G. (1987). “The power of nonparametric tests of preference maximi-
sation,” Econometrica, 55(3): 693–698.
Burks, Stephen V., Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Lorenz Goette, and Aldo Rustichini (2009).
“Cognitive skills affect economic preferences, strategic behavior, and job attach-
ment,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Choi, Syngjoo, Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale, and Shachar Kariv (2007a). “Consis-
tency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 97(5): 1921–1938.
Choi, Syngjoo, Raymond Fisman, Douglas M. Gale, and Shachar Kariv (2007b). “Re-
vealing preferences graphically: An old method gets a new tool kit,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 97(2): 153–158.
Choi, Syngjoo, Shachar Kariv, Wieland Mu¨ller, and Dan Silverman (2011). “Who is
(more) rational?” NBER Working Paper No. 16791.
Diewert, W. Erwin (2012). “Afriat’s theorem and some extensions to choice under
uncertainty,” Economic Journal, 122(560): 305–331.
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, and David Huffman (2010). “Are risk aversion and im-
patience related to cognitive ability?” American Economic Review, 100(3): 1238–
1260.
Fisman, Raymond J., Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits (2007). “Individual prefer-
ences for giving,” American Economic Review, 97(5): 1858–1876.
Gul, Faruk (1991). “A theory of disappointment aversion,” Econometrica, 59(3): 667–
686.
22
Hadar, Josef and William R. Russel (1969). “Rules for ordering uncertain prospects,”
American Economic Review, 59(1): 25–34.
Hanushek, Eric A. and Ludger Woessmann (2007). “The role of school improvement
in economic development,” NBER Working Papers 12832, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Holt, Charles A. and Susan K. Laury (2002). “Risk aversion and incentive effects,”
American Economic Review, 92(5): 1644–1655.
Houtman, Martijn and J. A. H. Maks (1985). “Determining all maximal data subsets
consistent with revealed preference,” Kwantitatieve Methoden, 6(19): 89–104.
John, O. P., E. M. Donahue, and R. L. Kentle (1991). “The Big Five Inventory—
versions 4a and 54,” Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of
Personality and Social Research.
John, Oliver P., Laura P. Naumann, and Christopher J. Soto (2008). “Paradigm shift
to the integrative big five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and conceptual is-
sues,” in Oliver P. John, Richard W. Robins, and Lawrence A. Pervin (eds.), “Hand-
book of Personality: Theory and Research,” chapter 4, New York: Guildford Press,
3 edition, pp. 114–158.
Lucas, Robert Jr. (1988). “On the mechanics of economic development,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 22(1): 3–42.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil (1992). “A contribution to the
empirics of economic growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2): 407–437.
Quiggin, John (1982). “A theory of anticipated utility,” Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 3(4): 323–343.
Quiggin, John (1990). “Stochastic dominance in regret theory,” Review of Economic
Studies, 57(3): 503–511.
Quiggin, John (1993). Generalized Expected Utility Theory: The Rank-Dependent
Model, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rabin, Matthew (2000). “Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration the-
orem,” Econometrica, 68(5): 1281–1292.
23
Samuelson, Paul Anthony (1947). Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Savage, Leonard J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley.
Stanovich, Keith E. (2009). What Intelligence Tests Miss: The Psychology of Rational
Thought, Yale University Press.
Varian, Hal R. (1982). “The nonparametric approach to demand analysis,” Economet-
rica, 107(4): 945–972.
Varian, Hal R. (1983). “Non-parametric tests of consumer behavior,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 50(1): 99–110.
Varian, Hal R. (1990). “Goodness-of-fit in optimizing models,” Journal of Economet-
rics, 46(1-2): 125–140.
Varian, Hal R. (1991). “Goodness of fit for revealed preference tests,” Technical Re-
port 13, Michigan – Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
Varian, Hal R. (2012). “Revealed preference and its applications,” Economic Journal,
122(560): 332–338.
Vermeulen, Frederic (2012). “Foundations of revealed preference: Introduction,” Eco-
nomic Journal, 122(560): 287–294.
Wakker, Peter (1993). “Savage’s axioms usually imply violation of strict stochastic
dominance,” Review of Economic Studies, 60(2): 487–493.
24
Figure 1. The cumulative distributions of CCEI scores 
 
 
Figure 2. The cumulative distributions of IQ scores 
 
 
Figure 3: An example of a budget line 
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An example of a budget line in the experiment. The point B, which lies on the 45 degree line, corresponds to the safe allocation with a certain payoff. This 
allocation is consistent with infinite risk aversion. By contrast, point C represents an allocation in which all tokens are allocated in the cheaper security. 
This allocation is consistent with risk neutrality. Any decision to allocate more tokens to the more expensive security (position along AB) is a violation of 
FOSD (more below). 
Figure 4. The construction of the CCEI for a simple violation of GARP 
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Here we have a violation of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) since ݔଵ is directly revealed preferred to ݔଶ and ݔଶ is 
directly revealed preferred to ݔଵ. A perturbation ܣ ܤ ൐ ܥ ܦ⁄⁄ of the budget line through allocation ݔଵ removes the violation. The CCEI 
can thus be interpreted as saying that the individual is `wasting' as much as 1 െ ܣ/ܤ of the income by making an inconsistent choice.
 Figure 5. A violation of first-order stochastic dominance 
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The individual can choose any allocation x′ (position along CD) but prefers allocation x (position along AB) such that ܨ௫ᇱ≤ܨ௫ 
where ܨ௫ᇱ and ܨ௫	are the resulting payoff distributions. Violations of first-order stochastic dominance may reasonably be 
regarded as errors, regardless of risk attitudes---that is, as a failure to recognize that some allocations yield payoff distributions 
with unambiguously lower returns.
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Figure 6. An illustration of an indifference curve for a disappointment averse individual (Gul, 1991) 
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The indifference curves have a kink at the 45 degree line. The nature of the kink is determined by the individual's disappointment aversion (α).The shape 
of the indifference curve on either side of the 45 degree line is determined by the individual's attitude toward risk (ρ in the CRRA specification and γ in 
the CARA specification). Note that an ambiguity averse individual chooses safe allocations satisfying ݔଵ ൌ ݔଶ when the security prices, are sufficiently 
similar. For EUT (α = 1), in contrast, the indifference curves are smooth everywhere. 
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Yale Law U. of
Low High School Bergen
0.950 0.856 0.868 0.982 0.932 0.936
0.079 0.143 0.150 0.036 0.117 0.135
1 0.584 0.274 0.509 1 0.858 0.348 0.304
5 0.803 0.648 0.585 5 0.889 0.705 0.670
10 0.866 0.687 0.658 10 0.925 0.809 0.791
25 0.933 0.783 0.755 25 0.990 0.924 0.942
50 0.986 0.890 0.935 50 1.000 0.981 0.987
75 0.999 0.971 0.990 75 1.000 0.999 1.000
90 1.000 1.000 1.000 90 1.000 1.000 1.000
95 1.000 1.000 1.000 95 1.000 1.000 1.000
99 1.000 1.000 1.000 99 1.000 1.000 1.000
# of obs. 126 106 110 # of obs. 49 121 135
Tanzania
Low High Low High
Mean 0.992 0.975 0.978 0.643 0.617 0.592
Sd 0.013 0.029 0.026 0.100 0.098 0.080
1 0.933 0.866 0.903 1 0.500 0.486 0.498
5 0.969 0.919 0.920 5 0.511 0.500 0.500
10 0.982 0.947 0.942 10 0.536 0.503 0.502
25 0.990 0.968 0.966 25 0.569 0.548 0.535
50 0.997 0.983 0.989 50 0.625 0.610 0.576
75 1.000 0.994 0.996 75 0.713 0.665 0.630
90 1.000 0.999 0.999 90 0.771 0.749 0.677
95 1.000 1.000 1.000 95 0.830 0.782 0.703
99 1.000 1.000 1.000 99 0.975 0.918 0.926
# of obs. 126 106 110 # of obs. 126 106 110
US
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Table 1. Summary statistics
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A.  CCEI scores
US
Tanzania
Mean
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B.  A comparison of CCEI scores
Mean
Sd
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UCLA
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Tanzania -0.087*** -0.095*** -0.098*** Tanzania -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
High-stakes 0.015 0.016 High-stakes 0.004 0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003)
Age -0.003 Age 0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Gender 0.010 Gender 0.003
(0.015) (0.003)
Big Five Big Five
Extraversion 0.008 Extraversion -0.001
(0.016) (0.003)
Agreeableness 0.021 Agreeableness 0.003
(0.021) (0.004)
Conscientiousness 0.014 Conscientiousness 0.005
(0.018) (0.003)
Neuroticism -0 012 Neuroticism -0 001
Table 2. The development gap in CCEI Table 3. The development gap in FOSD
. .
(0.017) (0.003)
Openness -0.007 Openness 0.001
(0.019) (0.004)
Constant 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.967*** Constant 0.992*** 0.992*** 0.985***
(0.011) 0.011 (0.058) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
α ρ α ρ α ρ
1.966 1.070 2.437 1.408 2.560 1.840
1.910 1.317 2.755 1.515 2.987 1.529
1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.000
5 1.000 0.058 1.000 0.158 1.000 0.291
10 1.000 0.108 1.000 0.221 1.000 0.545
25 1.000 0.270 1.000 0.527 1.000 0.806
50 1.196 0.624 1.179 0.828 1.086 1.265
75 1.983 1.254 2.118 1.250 2.065 2.350
90 3.701 3.151 9.358 5.000 9.506 5.000
95 6.849 5.000 10.000 5.000 10.000 5.000
99 10.000 5.000 10.000 5.000 10.000 5.000
% EUT
# of obs.
α γ α γ α γ
1.688 0.063 1.726 0.116 1.759 0.149
1.847 0.176 2.006 0.259 2.150 0.288
1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
5 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.004 1.000 0.010
10 1.000 0.004 1.000 0.007 1.000 0.017
25 1.000 0.009 1.000 0.016 1.000 0.024
50 1.000 0.018 1.000 0.025 1.000 0.036
75 1.298 0.039 1.177 0.052 1.245 0.086
90 2.858 0.091 2.266 0.374 2.939 0.625
95 6.683 0.194 5.574 1.000 9.042 1.000
99 10.000 1.000 10.000 1.000 10.000 1.000
% EUT
% of obs.
89.6 89.1
Tanzania
Low High
126
75.5 66.4
Sd
Pe
rc
en
til
es
65.1
106 110
Table 4. Estimation results (all subjects)
Mean
A. CRRA
81.7
106 110
B. CARA
Tanzania
Mean
Sd
Pe
rc
en
til
es
Low High
126
US
US
α ρ α ρ α ρ
2.008 1.067 2.771 1.588 2.918 2.034
1.948 1.344 3.052 1.687 3.319 1.652
1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
5 1.000 0.050 1.000 0.158 1.000 0.337
10 1.000 0.106 1.000 0.351 1.000 0.594
25 1.000 0.255 1.000 0.555 1.000 0.863
50 1.201 0.622 1.192 0.857 1.196 1.286
75 1.992 1.162 2.512 1.913 2.172 2.936
90 3.758 3.161 9.444 5.000 10.000 5.000
95 6.855 5.000 10.000 5.000 10.000 5.000
99 10.000 5.000 10.000 5.000 10.000 5.000
% EUT
# of obs.
α γ α γ α γ
1.719 0.064 1.936 0.154 1.903 0.191
1.887 0.180 2.329 0.302 2.346 0.330
1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
5 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.004 1.000 0.014
10 1.000 0.004 1.000 0.008 1.000 0.019
25 1.000 0.008 1.000 0.016 1.000 0.026
50 1.000 0.018 1.000 0.027 1.000 0.041
75 1.311 0.035 1.380 0.076 1.262 0.101
90 2.925 0.097 4.666 0.813 4.115 1.000
95 6.990 0.213 10.000 1.000 10.000 1.000
99 10.000 1.000 10.000 1.000 10.000 1.000
% EUT
% of obs.
120 74 77
B. CARA
US Tanzania
Low High
120 74 77
Mean
Sd
Pe
rc
en
til
es
80.8 87.8
61.0
Table 5. Estimation results (subjects with CCEI ≥ 0.8)
A. CRRA
US Tanzania
Low High
Mean
Sd
Pe
rc
en
til
es
64.2 68.9
87.0
(1) (2) (3)
(Joint) Tanzania -0.367*** -0.355*** -0.326***
Centile Low High (0.020) (0.024) (0.029)
25 0.827 0.063 0.390 0.330 High-stakes -0.024 -0.027
50 0.950 0.341 0.657 0.532 (0.025) (0.025)
75 0.995 0.635 0.838 0.798 Age -0.003
25 0.977 0.087 0.362 0.330 (0.003)
50 0.991 0.278 0.714 0.550 Gender 0.041
75 0.998 0.556 0.895 0.835 (0.021)
25 0.462 0.000 0.410 0.431 Big Five
50 0.692 0.079 0.800 0.853 Extraversion -0.010
75 0.846 0.468 0.981 0.991 (0.024)
# of obs. 342 126 106 110 Agreeableness -0.032
(0.030)
Conscientiousness 0.001
(0.025)
N ti i 0 028
I
Q
Fraction of subjects
TanzaniaUS
Table 7. The development gap in IQ
C
C
E
I
F
O
S
D
Table 6. The overlap of the CCEI and IQ scores distributions
The fractions of Tanzanian and US subjects whose scores are below 
the (joint) centile.
euro c sm - .
0.024
Openness -0.003
0.028
Constant 0.856*** 0.856*** 0.903***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.075)
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 10, 5, 
and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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